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From The Asian Reporter, V13, #2 (January 7-13, 2003), page 16.
Jihadistan
Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia
By Ahmed Rashid
Yale University Press, 2002
Hardbound, 282 pages, $24.00
By Douglas Spangle
Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist, spent much of the 1990s
investigating the political situation in Central Asia. When the World
Trade Center Towers were attacked in New York on September 11, 2001, his
book Taliban had just been published, a modestly produced look at
the fundamentalist mafia then running Afghanistan. Along with the Qu’ran
and a couple of works on Islamic culture, his book became a runaway
bestseller, swiftly bought out by Americans who wanted explanations about
what the workings of Islam meant and were even unsure where Afghanistan
was.
Yale University Press has released Jihad, his follow-up study, a
noticeably slicker, better-produced product. While Rashid was researching
the Taliban and its connections, he found himself in the former Soviet
republics of Central Asia north of Afghanistan. If Central Asia soon
produces once-obscure new trouble spots, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are likely to be among them. The
current U.S. administration’s notoriously short attention span is at the
moment engaged by its old nemesis Saddam Hussein, but further crises are
bound to occur in Central Asia. Information for the general public on
these Central Asian republics is as scarce as their potential for trouble
is large.
The old Soviet regime, in less than a century, did everything possible
to make a mess of these once powerful and independent states. It
gerrymandered ethnicities, suppressed religion, fostered unworkable
industrial and agricultural projects, put a series of obdurate and
repressive functionaries in place to carry out its policies. When the
Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, it pulled out its personnel,
equipment, and subsidies, leaving behind its apparatchiks and its
legacy of political high-handedness. The challenges of governing included
ethnic disputes, ecological disaster, and massive unemployment — which
these autocrats were woefully unprepared to cope with. And neighboring
Afghanistan was quickly becoming a nest of devils.
Cruelly, the disintegration of Afghanistan was a boon for
otherwise-unemployable young Uzbeks and Tajiks, who were finally able to
draw wages by marching for various warlords and zealots. The blowback was
that fundamentalist fervor was drawn right back into the republics, which,
as former Soviet holdings, had previously had no such charismatic
tradition to contend with. Local Islamic revolutionary organizations
formed. When leaders like Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov reacted with
predictably heavy-handed expedients of brutality and imprisonment, the
Islamic revolutionary groups radicalized further, becoming ever more
intransigent and dangerous — also better trained and organized than
government troops.
The hapless government of Tajikistan soon caved in to a civil war, and
then settled into an uneasy coalition between former insurgents and the
Soviet-style establishment. This may eventually prove to have saved the
country. Uzbekistan’s autocrat Karimov, however, persisted in the folly
of persecuting the local Islamists rather than dealing more constructively
with them. Beatings, disappearances, summary imprisonment, and executions
served merely to stiffen fundamentalist resistance. Uzbekistan’s war on
fundamentalism also served as an effective training ground for freebooting
Chechen, Daghestani, Pakistani, and Uighur revolutionaries, who in almost
every battle proved superior to demoralized government forces. If Russia,
China, and the United States haven’t noticed or responded
constructively, it is because of their capacity for denial and
inextricable involvement with ruthless strongmen. The chickens of war seem
always to find their way back to the roost.
To its detraction, Ahmed Rashid’s story in Jihad hardly
mentions the republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, or Turkmenistan (all
with horror stories of their own), and is already several years backdated
— as with the previous book Taliban, its sources precede 2001. In
the interim the American action in Afghanistan has played to its current
pass (including a military presence in Uzbekistan) and the Taliban and
World Trade Center towers have long since fallen. But Jihad is far
from irrelevant: Rashid’s observation is acute and the problem has not
gone away — the world’s eyes are merely elsewhere at the moment. Roll
out a world map, locate the Central Asian republics, and memorize them.
There will be cause to later remember them when the chickens inevitably
come home to roost.
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